As part of its ongoing efforts to document serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law arising from recent military aggression by the United States and Israel against Iran, the Organization for Defending Victims of Violence (ODVV) conducted an in-depth interview with Helena Cobban, a respected analyst of international affairs and Middle East specialist. With decades of experience in journalism, research, and policy analysis, Cobban is widely recognized for her work on conflict dynamics, international law, and peace-building processes. She is also the founder of the Just World Educational platform, which focuses on informed dialogue and global justice.
In this interview, she reflects on patterns of military conduct, the structural limitations of international accountability mechanisms, and the broader implications of attacks on civilian infrastructure, cultural heritage, and regional stability.
The perspectives expressed in this interview do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the Organization for Defending Victims of Violence.
The full transcript of the interview follows:
1. When you think about the recent attacks by the United States and Israel against Iran, what was most shocking and new to you in this unfolding war? How do you see these attacks in relation to the experiences in Palestine and across the region?
The violations that we have seen are deeply shocking—but they are not new. Similar tactics have been used before by Israel in Palestine and Lebanon, dating back as far as 1982. We have also seen comparable actions undertaken by the United States in Iraq, Vietnam, and elsewhere.
What I find particularly alarming, however, is the use of targeted assassination operations against individuals who were engaged in peace negotiations at the time. For example, I would point to the assassination attempt against Khalil al-Hayya of Hamas, who, in 2025, was involved in ceasefire discussions. During such deliberations, targeting individuals in negotiation contexts suggests a strategy of entrapment—drawing opponents into dialogue only to attack them.
I would also highlight the systematic targeting of internationally protected civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, rescue workers, and essential services. These patterns have been clearly documented in Gaza over an extended period, as well as in Lebanon, and more recently in attacks involving the United States and Israel against Iran since February 28.
2. Given the fact that a large part of the U.S. and Israeli attacks targeted Iran’s civilian infrastructure—and many ordinary people were killed in the process—why do the existing international institutions struggle to ensure effective accountability for the widespread and repeated attacks on civilian infrastructure in different conflict areas? What practical changes could improve accountability?
International institutions struggle largely because they are dominated by U.S. and Western policy elites, and particularly because of the U.S. veto power. Some analysts compare this to the Suez Crisis of 1956, when the United States was able to bypass British and French vetoes through economic pressure and mechanisms such as “Uniting for Peace.” But today’s situation is very different. What we are seeing now involves the United States itself—along with its junior partner, Israel—as central actors in these violations. Attempts to circumvent the U.S. veto under current conditions are therefore extremely difficult. The United States occupies a position at the pinnacle of international power structures, and at the same time is one of the main violators. As for practical changes, anything that would improve accountability would have to undercut or prevent the United States from exercising its veto power—both formally within the United Nations and de facto in institutions such as the International Criminal Court, of which it is not even a member but still exerts significant influence.
3. In your recent writings, you have raised the idea of reducing militarization in the Persian Gulf region and promoting cooperative security arrangements. What initial practical steps could be taken to ensure the interests and security of all countries in the region, including Iran?
I would frame this specifically as a proposal for the Persian Gulf region, involving all littoral (coastal) states. The current political structure of the southern Gulf states reflects historical legacies, particularly from the period of British and East India Company influence. This has resulted in a fragmented regional structure. A first practical step toward cooperative security would be the verified withdrawal of all foreign military forces from the coastal region—potentially within a defined distance, such as 200 kilometers from the coastline. At the same time, a multilateral process—similar to the Helsinki process at the end of the Cold War—could help build trust and cooperation among regional states. Another useful historical example is the Franco-German reconciliation after World War II, where economic cooperation (such as the European Coal and Steel Community) laid the foundation for long-term peace. A similar framework could be developed among Gulf states.
4. Attacks on historical and religious sites in Iran—which are a shared heritage for all of us—what impact do they have on long-term regional peace and the peace process? Are these attacks, contrary to international law and agreements on the protection of cultural heritage?How much could these actions prevent reconciliation between nations in the future?
Yes, attacks on cultural and religious sites are clearly contrary to international law. In Iran, such attacks may actually have strengthened national unity more than the attackers anticipated. In Gaza and Lebanon, however, the situation has been more severe. Entire cities, towns, and communities have been razed to the ground, including cultural and historical landmarks. There has also been deliberate destruction of mosques and churches. These actions carry serious long-term risks. They damage not only physical structures but also collective memory, identity, and the prospects for reconciliation. In the Gulf region, any state that has supported such attacks should reconsider its alignment with U.S. and Israeli military strategies. In places like Gaza and Lebanon, however, the issue is even more complex, as the prospects for reconciliation are deeply uncertain given the scale and nature of the destruction.